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Abstract 
 
We provide a comparison of poverty levels in Britain and the US based on a set of common 
definitions.  We then ask what factors – demographic, economic, or policy – account for the 
observed changes in poverty in the two nations and what role could policy play in reducing 
poverty?  We find that the forces influencing poverty differ between nations and across 
absolute and relative poverty measures.  Demographic and wage change is a dominant force 
in both nations.  Government benefits reduced relative and absolute poverty considerably in 
Britain over this period but had little impact in the US.  However, policy changes may have 
significantly increased work in the US, particularly among single parents, whereas in Britain 
they may have had the reverse effect.  The UK government has committed itself to reducing 
child poverty by half over the next 10 years and to its abolition within 20 years.  We conclude 
that any purely work-based strategy, which doesn’t tackle demographics and wage 
dispersion, may not have a dramatic effect on relative poverty. 
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Introduction 
 
Scholars in the United Kingdom emphasize that poverty in Britain has risen sharply since the 
late 1970s.  According to Goodman et al. (1997), after remaining steady at roughly 11% 
though the 60s and falling to 8 or 9% in the 70s, it has since doubled.  Meanwhile in the 
United States, both official figures and traditional poverty scholars report sharp declines in 
poverty.  Since reaching 15% in the early 1980s, official poverty rates are now at 11%.  The 
black poverty rate and the rate for single parents are at their lowest level in the 40 years for 
which data is reported.1  What accounts for the apparent divergence?  More importantly, what 
factors – demographic, economic, or policy – account for the changes in poverty in the two 
nations?  And what role could policy play in reducing poverty? 
Of course a major reason for the differences in reported poverty trends is that the 
nations remain divided by a common language with a very uncommon set of definitions.  In 
Britain and Europe, poverty is traditionally measured according to a relative scale – families 
are considered poor if their incomes fall below 60% of the (family size adjusted) median 
income.  By contrast, in the US, poverty is measured against an absolute standard that is 
adjusted annually only for inflation.  More subtle distinctions include the fact that in Britain 
poverty is typically based on weekly income net of taxes, while in the US it is based on gross 
annual income. 
In this paper, we work to create common measures of poverty in the two nations.  We 
develop a procedure that allows one to more fully trace out the relative impacts of altered 
demographics, rising wage inequality, work changes, and policy innovations in explaining 
changing poverty patterns than the usual aggregate models allow.  And we use this procedure 
to determine the forces shaping poverty in the two nations.  Our basic methodological idea is 
straightforward if rather difficult to implement.  For members of the sample in any given 
year, we estimate what each person’s and family’s work, wages, and benefits would have 
been if the structure of pay, employment, or aid had been equivalent to that of a base year.  
We can then estimate what poverty would have been if one or all of the base year conditions 
still prevailed. 
Using this method, we find that the forces influencing poverty differ across nations 
and across absolute versus relative poverty measures.  A number of important findings 
emerge from this paper: 
                                                 
1 US Bureau of the Census (2000). 
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· Britain and the US share some broad patterns in common – relative poverty 
has risen in both nations albeit much more so in Britain, and in recent years, 
absolute poverty has fallen in both.   
 
· There are very sizeable differences in the magnitudes and trends.  By 
measures used here, the US has considerably higher relative poverty.  But very 
importantly, relative poverty in Britain has risen far more sharply over the past 
20 years, and the gap between the countries has closed considerably. 
 
· In both nations demographic change and rising wage inequality played key 
roles in increasing relative poverty, but the impacts were far greater in Britain.  
Yet for absolute poverty, wage changes had almost no net effect in Britain, 
while they had a modest effect in the US.   
 
· Britain has experienced a dramatic rise in workless households while the US 
has simultaneously had a sharp fall.  In Britain this had a sizeable impact on 
relative and absolute poverty.  In the US increasing work has had little impact 
on relative poverty but resulted in a sizeable reduction of absolute poverty. 
 
· Ignoring any behavioural impacts, expanding government benefits reduced 
relative and absolute poverty considerably in Britain over this period.  By 
contrast as compared to 1979, the impacts of US benefits were almost 
negligible. 
 
· Both the level and structure of government aid differs enormously across the 
two nations.  Government benefits for workless households are higher and 
have grown in Britain.  In the US, government benefits for those with no 
earnings have been cut dramatically, while in recent years, benefits for those 
with low to moderate earnings have risen considerably.   
 
· The changing patterns of benefits and work strongly suggest that in the US at 
least, policy changes have significantly influenced work behaviour, 
particularly by single parents, and thus altered poverty.  In Britain the policy 
changes may have had the reverse effect, reducing work among many groups, 
though the evidence is far from conclusive.  
 
· The relatively modest changes in incentives currently contemplated by UK 
policymakers will still leave Britain with a vastly different structure of 
benefits than the US.  Based on the results of this paper, we suspect they will 
have a modest impact on work.  Only a strategy that will dramatically increase 
work and significantly increase the incomes of lower paid workers will have a 
really sizeable impact on relative poverty.  And both of these will prove hard 
to achieve.  Any purely work-based strategy which doesn’t tackle 
demographics and wage dispersion, may not have a dramatic effect on relative 
poverty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 3
1.  Measuring Poverty in Britain and the US 
 
Our first goal is to create as common a set of poverty definitions across the two countries as 
possible.  This involves recognizing different types of poverty standards, the definitions of 
income, and definitions of families. 
 
Relative versus absolute poverty standards  
 
Poverty is typically defined as a situation where family income falls below some poverty 
standard that varies by family size.  But the way the standard is determined differs by 
country. 
There is no official poverty standard in Britain, but there is something of a 
conventional wisdom.  Poverty has traditionally been defined as having net household 
income after taxes below half the mean (with appropriate adjustments for family size). 
However, more recently a relative measure based upon 60% of median income has gained 
prominence and has been adopted as the official poverty standard by Eurostat.2  These 
relative measures are based on the assumption that poverty is best understood as depending 
on where a family stands in comparison to others.  If the income of disadvantaged families 
rises slightly, but the average income of families overall rises a great deal, poverty will 
increase using this measure. 
The US does have an official poverty standard and it is widely used.  The government 
defines poverty using an absolute standard that has been essentially unchanged3 in real terms 
for 35 years.  The absolute standard assumes that what matters is the absolute position of a 
family.  If the income of disadvantaged families rises slightly, but the average income of 
families overall rises a great deal, poverty will decrease using this measure. 
There is a large and energetic literature about the pros and cons of relative and 
absolute measures.  Both have their virtues.  The notion that a near poor family is no worse 
off if the standard of living of most other families rises considerably seems implausible.  
What were luxuries, such as telephones and indoor plumbing, become necessities as the 
society becomes more prosperous.  A relative measure seems to come closer to capturing the 
                                                 
2 Note also that the UK government’s commitment to eradicate child poverty is based on a poverty definition of 
60% of median household income. 
3 There have been minor changes to definitions and family size adjustments over the years. 
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larger notions of poverty which might involve a sense of connection or inclusion in the 
overall society.   
At the same time, it seems odd to assume that low income families would be worse 
off if their income rose 40% over a decade while the income of the average family rose by 
50%.  An absolute measure captures the notion that having more food or better housing can 
be a benefit even if others do as well or even better. 
Absolute standards pose another problem for international work – how should a 
common absolute standard be set?  One possibility is to use a common standard adjusted for 
the exchange rate and differences in purchasing power.  Since the US is somewhat wealthier 
by this standard than Britain, there will almost inevitably be more poverty in Britain.  These 
issues do not arise with relative standards since each country is being measured relative to its 
mean or median income. 
For purposes of this paper, we will examine both absolute and relative measures, 
though we will concentrate disproportionately on relative measures since this volume is 
focused on the British economy.  For relative poverty we use 60% of median income and use 
the family size adjustment derived by McClements (1977), which is commonly used in 
Britain. 
For absolute poverty standards we used slightly different procedures in each country.  
In Britain, we set the absolute standard for poverty equal to 60% of median income in 1979.  
Thus for 1979 in Britain, the measure of absolute and relative poverty is the same.  After 
1979 the relative poverty line rises or falls with median income, but the absolute measure 
remains unchanged (except for inflation adjustments).   
We experimented with two different absolute poverty standards for the US.  One was 
to use the 60% of median 1979 income in the US, just as was done for Britain.  This yields a 
1999 poverty standard of  $32,652 for a family of four4 – considerably above the US official 
standard of $17,356.  More importantly this procedure also yields an absolute poverty 
standard that is considerably higher in purchasing power parity terms for the US than for 
Britain because US average incomes were higher in 1979.  If the 1999 US-UK purchasing 
power parity is applied to the 60% median 1979 income standard for Britain, the poverty line 
in the US would instead have been $20,047 – much closer to the official US poverty line.  
Given the likely interest of US readers in the official poverty line, we report in the body of 
the text absolute figures for the US using the official US standards.  We have done all 
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calculations using both standards.  The trends for the 60% median 1979 US income standard 
are virtually identical and Figure 7 which uses the official poverty line is reproduced using 
the 60% median 1979 standard as Appendix Figure A1. 
 
Definition of income and family/household unit 
 
Poverty is generally measured using large cross-sectional surveys in each country, but there 
are important differences in what the surveys measure.  Successive waves of the Family 
Expenditure Survey (FES), based on interviews from roughly 10,000 households annually, 
are typically used to determine poverty levels.  Income is a weekly measure.  When poverty 
is measured, researchers generally count as income:  earnings, dividends, interest, rent, 
pensions and government aid including nearly all Social Security benefits and housing.5  
Taxes are deducted from income to give a sense of disposable income.  Often the income is 
calculated both before and after housing costs to control for unmeasured inputted incomes of 
owner occupiers and because housing costs often vary greatly by region. 
The issue of housing is further complicated in Britain by the provision of social 
housing.  In 1980 about 33% of tenants were living in government provided housing with 
subsidised rents.  A large proportion of the social housing stock was sold off to tenants 
through the “Right to Buy” policy of the Thatcher government.  Furthermore, rents were 
deregulated and from 1983 housing aid was provided through Housing Benefit which covers 
housing costs for eligible claimants.  As rents increased so did housing benefits.  This 
resulted in a shift in housing aid from subsidized rents to cash support through benefit 
payments.  The FES does collect information on cash support from Housing Benefits, and it 
reports whether people resided in social housing, but it has no estimate of the value of the 
subsidies to these residents.  If one counts the value of the cash Housing Benefit but ignores 
the value of these social housing subsidies, one would show a sizeable increase in housing aid 
that is partly the result of moving such aid from the uncounted social housing subsidy to the 
counted Housing Benefit.  Because these subsidies are administered and funded at Local 
Authority level rather than household level, there is no reliable information with which to 
determine the exact subsidies that different families received over time.  One can, however, 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 The poverty standard varies somewhat by the relationships of the four family members.  This figure is the 
weighted average for all families with exactly 4 members. 
5 In Britain, virtually all non-housing aid is  called Social Security benefits.  To avoid confusion with the very 
different US Social Security system, which is primarily for the aged and disabled, we will generally refer to 
British Social Security benefits as “government aid” broadly to include these benefits along with housing. 
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get a measure of the aggregate subsidy from Local Authority Housing Revenue Accounts.  
And the FES does include a measure of the rent actually paid by housing tenants.  After some 
experimentation, we imputed housing subsidy by applying the national percentage subsidy 
(expressed as a percentage of rent), to the rents reported by families and individuals in social 
housing. 
In official US statistics, the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) is used.  The March CPS collects information about income and work over the 
previous year from respondents in 40,000 – 50,000 households each year.  For measuring 
poverty, income is based on gross annual income including earnings, rent, dividends, and 
interest, plus cash benefits from the government.  Taxes are not deducted and so called “in-
kind” benefits are left out.  This excludes some very important sources of government aid 
such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (“taxes”) and food stamps and housing aid (“in-kind 
benefits”).  Numerous scholars, including a recent panel of the National Academy of 
Sciences, have called for revising this standard6 by ensuring that income is adjusted for taxes 
and most in-kind aid7, and work expenses.   
We use the FES and CPS data for this study.  We have no choice but to use weekly 
income in the FES and annual income in the CPS.  Since weekly income is more volatile than 
annual income, we would expect British poverty would be lower if it were based on an 
annual measure.8 In the US data, we add the value of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
food stamps, and housing benefits to other income for purposes of determining poverty.  This 
correction should provide a more accurate picture of US gross income. 
We cannot create after housing poverty measures for the US because information on 
housing expenditures is not collected in the CPS.  Gross versus net income poses a different 
problem.  Our methodology calls for estimating what each person and family would earn 
under different conditions in different years.  As their income changes so too would their 
taxes owed.  The structure of taxes is sufficiently complex, especially in the US, that it is far 
beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the new taxes for families under a variety of 
changed conditions.9 
                                                 
6 Citro and Michael (1995). 
7 The question of whether medical benefits should be included in income remains controversial. 
8 Böheim and Jenkins (2000) show that income analysis based upon current monthly and annual incomes 
provide remarkably similar results, although there is some question over reliability of the annual income 
measure which is largely imputed from monthly data. 
9 In Britain, we have more hope.  We have access to the IFS Taxben model which can calculate taxes and 
transfers for any family under any conditions.  In later versions, we may use this model to estimate net income 
for Britain.  We have no such model for the US.  Though such models do exist for the US, of course, they are 
often quite massive and would be quite difficult to implement here. 
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Figure 1 illustrates for Britain what difference the definition makes.  It tracks relative 
poverty in Britain using gross and net income, with and without housing.  Although the 
measures differ in their levels, they track each other almost perfectly over time.  To facilitate 
comparisons and calculations, we will use poverty based on gross income before housing.  It 
is intriguing that this measure is very close to one based on net income after housing.  In the 
1980s gross income before housing poverty is between 1.5 and 2 percentage points higher.  
This difference narrows somewhat in the 1990s.  Since our goal is to understand the key 
trends, we are convinced that our measure will perform quite well. 
 
Households, families, and filing units 
 
Unfortunately the definition of families and households differ slightly between countries as 
well.  In Britain, the economic unit is based on definitions comparable to benefit units for 
purposes of determining Social Security.  This comes close to a household definition of an 
income unit.  In particular, cohabiting couples are treated equivalently to married couples. 
Incomes are measured at the household level since this is how some benefits are determined.  
The US is based on families – defined as persons who are related by birth or marriage who 
are living together in the same household.  Unrelated adults in the same household are usually 
considered separate units.  Thus cohabiting couples would appear as two separate units.  In 
the past several years the CPS has refined its procedure to allow easier identification of 
cohabiting couples.  Moreover, it is possible to infer cohabiting couples in earlier years.10  
But we are also seeking to create units that are logically joined for benefit purposes since we 
estimate changes in benefits.  Cohabiters are generally not included in the filing unit for 
benefits.  Thus we choose to maintain the standard census definition of family where 
cohabiters are not included in the unit.  There has been growth in cohabitation in recent years, 
but based on our previous work, we do not think treating cohabiters separately would change 
poverty trends much, though poverty would likely be slightly lower with a more inclusive 
definition of the unit.  
 
 
 
                                                 
10 See Ellwood (2000) for a detailed description of how this can be done. 
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Young versus old 
 
In this study we have also chosen to limit our attention to families with household heads who 
are under 60 years of age.  The work, retirement activity, and benefit structures are very 
different for older persons.  Retirement patterns have changed over time in both countries.  
Britain has experienced a large growth in occupational pension schemes which have raised 
the incomes of pensioners.  In both countries, pension benefits will be linked at least partly to 
past earnings which we cannot model or observe in this cross-sectional data.  Thus we have 
chosen to limit our sample to households where the worker is unlikely to be retired or a 
pensioner. 
 
 
2.  The Trends in Relative and Absolute Poverty in the US and UK 
 
Figure 2 shows the trends in relative poverty in Britain and the US between 1979 and 1999 
using our gross income before housing, 60% median income standard for households with a 
head under 60.   
 
· In 1979, the countries were far apart in relative poverty.  Poverty in Britain 
was 13%; in the US it was over 26%.  In the following 20 years poverty grew 
in both countries.  But poverty growth was much greater in Britain than the 
US.  Between 1979 and 1999, poverty rose 11 percentage points in Britain, 
while rising “just” 4 points in the US.   
 
The British trends are quite consistent with those reported by Goodman, Johnson and 
Webb (1997) and Department of Social Security (1999), as well as those reported for Britain 
and the US in Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997).   
Figure 3 shows the measures of absolute poverty.  It illustrates absolute poverty in 
both countries using the 60% median 1979 income absolute standard.  And it shows poverty 
in the US using the official US measure. 
 
· In contrast to the relative measures, absolute poverty in both countries mostly 
follow a rather clear cyclical path, rising during the recessions of 1982-83, 
falling in the mid 80s, rising again in 1992-93, and falling back sharply in 
recent years. 
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Not surprisingly the choice of poverty standard for the US makes a big difference in 
the level of absolute poverty.  The vastly lower official standard leads to half the poverty rate 
that one might have projected otherwise.  
 
· When one compares absolute US poverty using the official standard and 
absolute poverty in Britain using a 60% median 1979 income standard, the 
poverty rates are much closer.  The US standard is somewhat lower ($17,356 
in 1999 versus the purchasing power equivalent of $20,047 for the absolute 
standard in Britain) and so poverty is somewhat lower in the US but the trends 
remain similar. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 reveal why it is important to be clear about whether one is comparing 
relative or absolute poverty.  Using either measure the US does not perform very well, but 
relative poverty makes Britain’s performance seem far worse than that of the US:  poverty 
grew vastly more in Britain.  Using absolute poverty, Britain has done as well or better than 
the US in recent years.  As noted earlier, we will exclusively use the US official poverty 
standard in exploring absolute poverty for the US in the remainder of the paper. 
What then explains the trends over time and, in particular, the differential 
performance in relative poverty?  There are many possible explanations for these changes – a 
rise in single parent families, rising wage inequality, changing work patterns, or altered 
government aid.  The challenge for this paper is to understand these trends. 
 
 
3.  Possible Explanations for the Changing Patterns of Poverty 
 
The trends for Britain described above are relatively well known.  A variety of important 
work has already been done exploring the role of demographic and economic factors.  We 
summarise several explanations below.  
 
Changing demographic patterns 
 
Goodman, Johnson and Webb (1997), Davies and Joshi (1998) and many others document 
the changing mix of demographic characteristics among the poor.  In both the US and Britain, 
a rising share of families are headed by women, and these families have far higher poverty 
rates than husband-wife families.  Thus, in Britain for example, lone parents with children 
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have risen from 5% of those in the bottom income quintile in the early 1960s to 15% by the 
early 1990s. 
 
Changing wage patterns 
 
Real wages have risen in Britain over much of this period, but so too has wage dispersion.  
Machin (1999) reports that median male wages rose from £6.13 in 1980 to £7.57 in 1996.  
Yet during the same period the ratio of wages of men at the 90th percentile of the hourly wage 
distribution to those at the 10th percentile rose from 3.10 in 1975 to 3.96 in 1996.  Similar 
changes occurred for women.  Uniformly rising wages would have relatively little impact on 
relative poverty, but the widening dispersion would push such poverty up.  (Of course if 
incomes in work are rising faster than incomes out of work then relative poverty will rise 
with growing earnings, even if wage dispersion did not grow, because median incomes would 
rise and more people without earnings would fall below the poverty standard.)  By contrast, a 
uniform rise in wages would reduce absolute poverty (as more people are pulled above the 
fixed standard) but growing dispersion would work in the opposite direction.  Since average 
wages grew in Britain and the dispersion widened, wage patterns seem likely to have pushed 
up relative poverty and had ambiguous impacts on absolute deprivation. 
 In sharp contrast to Britain, Mishel et al. (1999) report that median wages of men in 
the US fell from $14.37 to $12.80 between 1980 and 1998.  But like Britain the 90/10 ratio 
rose over the period, from 3.62 to 4.51.  For women median wages actually rose from $9.13 
to $10.00, but the 90/10 ratio grew even more than it did for men, from 2.85 to 3.89.  Thus it 
would seem that wage changes for men in the US would increase both absolute and relative 
poverty, while patterns for women would increase relative poverty at least. 
 
Changing employment and the pattern of "worklessness"  
 
Unemployment in Britain rose sharply over a large stretch of the recent period but has since 
fallen to a twenty year low of around 5%.  Nevertheless, the non-employment rate of men has 
remained high due to a large increase in inactivity, particularly among older, less skilled men.  
Furthermore, since the mid 1970s there has been a significant polarisation of work across 
households, so that by the late 1990s 17% of all households were without work as described 
in Gregg et al. (1999a) and Gregg and Wadsworth (2000).  These households contain 4 
million adults (13%) and 2.6 million children (18%). Some 70% of these workless 
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households are poor and this rises to 90% where children are present. Ercolani and Jenkins 
(1998) use shift share analysis to show that the small increases in income inequality in the 
first half of the 1990s occur within and not between work rich and work poor households. We 
suspect that such polarisation may have been more important in influencing poverty in earlier 
periods and perhaps later periods as well. 
By contrast in the US, employment levels seem to be high and growing in recent 
years.  Unemployment rates are extremely low by US standards.  A number of authors 
including Blank et al., 2000; Ellwood, 2000 and Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000 have 
emphasized the sharp rise in work among single mothers in the US in recent years.  There has 
been some decline in work among men over this period, a trend that some authors attribute to 
expanded disability benefits, though this conclusion remains quite controversial.11   
 
Social policy structures and "reforms"  
 
Social policies are generally designed to mitigate hardships caused by low incomes that result 
from limited work, low pay, or single parenthood.  Thus one would expect them to dampen 
the impact of the other factors cited above.  In addition, social policies in Britain and the US 
have undergone repeated "reforms" over the past quarter century.  Benefits have risen and 
fallen.  New programmes have been added.  Some have been eliminated and most recently in 
both countries, governments have moved toward a more work-oriented strategy, including 
expanded tax credits for workers, and at least some increase in work expectations.  Policy 
changes obviously influence poverty both directly, by affecting the total income that 
individuals and families in a particular situation receive, and by altering behaviour.  There is 
a sizeable body of work in both countries examining the role that social policies and 
incentives can have on work behaviour and poverty.12 
 All of these factors – demography, work, wages, and benefits – may have influenced 
policy in complex ways.  We propose to extend the work of others on each of these individual 
topics by decomposing the altered patterns of poverty over time into the relative role that 
each of these factors may have played.  The work of Goodman, Johnson and Webb (1997) 
offers the closest analogy, but their focus is primarily on inequality, and they seek to 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Bound and Waidmann (1992), DeLeire (forthcoming), Gruber and Kubik (1994), Haveman 
et al., (1991). 
12 See for example Blundell (2000), Blundell et al., (2000),Gregg et al., (1999b), Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000),  
Moffitt, (1992). 
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decompose the aggregate level of inequality into various components whereas we are more 
narrowly focussed on poverty and will do the decomposition on a more micro level.13   
 
 
4.  Decomposing the Trends in Poverty Among Families and Working Age 
Adults – Aggregate Methods and Micro Methods 
 
There are two different strategies one might pursue in seeking to parse the changing patterns 
of poverty – one using aggregate data at its heart and the other using micro data.  While we 
always intended to rely primarily on the use of a time-series of cross-sectional micro data for 
our work, we initially tried estimating some aggregate models because their simplicity makes 
them relatively easy to perform and common in the literature.  
 
Aggregate analyses 
 
Blank and Blinder (1986), Blank and Card (1993), and Cutler and Katz (1991) are among the 
chief contributors to the literature that seeks to explain variations in poverty using aggregate 
data in the US, while Gregg and Machin (1994) and Nolan (1986) have done key work for 
Britain.  The basic strategy has typically been to regress aggregate poverty rates on factors 
such as unemployment rates, mean wages, inflation rates, GDP, demographic measures, 
government benefit levels, etc.   
Unfortunately when we estimated such models we found them to be unstable and 
quite sensitive to specification.  This should presumably come as no surprise given the time 
series nature of the data.  Especially when we tried to separately identify wage levels, wage 
dispersion, unemployment, worklessness, and government benefits, we found that the results 
had no power at all.  Aggregate methods by their very nature cannot do a very good job of 
distinguishing spurious from real effects.  Thus we turned to micro methods for our analysis. 
                                                 
13 Goodman, Johnson and Webb (1997) do have a chapter on poverty, but they do not offer much decomposition 
of the trends in that segment. 
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Micro methodology 
 
The overall aim of this paper can probably best be represented with the question:  what would 
the poverty rate have been today if the structure of wages, work or benefits had remained at 
some base year level?  For example, since 1979 the distribution of wages has widened 
considerably, but employment, family structures, and benefit structures have changed as well.  
Thus a natural first question would be to ask how different the poverty rate would have been 
in 1999 had the distribution of wages been the same as in 1979 while everything else was at 
the actual 1999 level?  This kind of experiment essentially requires that we assign each 
person who was working in 1999 a wage that an equivalent person would have earned in 
1979, and then recalculate the poverty rate.  A similar methodology can also be applied to 
work and benefit structures.   
For all members of the sample in any given year, we estimate each person’s and 
family’s work, wages, and benefits given the structures of pay, employment, or benefits in a 
chosen base year.  We can then estimate what poverty would have been if the base year 
conditions still prevailed.  For this work we need to look at individual family income. A 
family is poor if their equivalised family income is below the poverty threshold. 
 
1
( * )
Where:
total family income for the family at time t
number of adults in the family
wage of adult i at time t
h
nadults
t it it t t
i
t
j
it
it
TotalIncome wage hours govtben othinc
TotalIncome
Nadults
wage
hours
=
= + +
=
=
=
=
å
ours worked by adult i at time t
government benefits received by family at time t
other income of the family at time t
t
t
govtben
othinc
=
=
 
 
We would like to have a model of each of the key variables above – wages, hours, and 
government benefits – that would allow us to explore what might have happened had wage or 
work or government benefit patterns been different.  
 
Wages 
 
For each year we estimate the following wage equation: 
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( )
where:
measured characteristics of the person at time t
wage W Xit t it it
Xit
e= +
=
 
 
In practice, we estimate separate wage equations for men and women in each year.  
The characteristics included vary somewhat across the UK and US.  Both include age and 
education dummies and number of children.  In the US we also include race dummies.  
We will need a wage prediction for everyone (aged over 16) in the sample in each 
year t because under some assumptions more people will be working.  This is relatively 
straightforward.  We predict an individual’s wage in year t based on their characteristics Xit .  
For those with an observed wage we assign them their actual residual from the wage equation 
(the predicted wage in year t is therefore the observed wage in that year for people who 
already work).  For those who are not working we do not observe a residual and so randomly 
assign them a residual from the year t residual distribution.  This gives us predicted wages in 
year t for all individuals in the sample without changing the distribution. Of course if more 
people worked the distribution might change even beyond that predicted by the model.  
Those who did not initially work might be drawn from the lower tail of the wage distribution.  
Much of this is already accounted for in the base prediction which does depend on measured 
characteristics.  We experimented with Heckman type selection models in this work.  In 
principle nothing prevents their use.  But we lacked a good selection instrument and found 
that including these selection equations did little to change our results.  Thus we have chosen 
instead to maintain the original distribution. 
We then want to predict an individual’s wage in year t given the wage structure of 
some base year s.  To do this we need to account for the impact of the implicitly different 
returns to measured characteristics Xit  in the base year s, but we also need to take account of 
the changed distribution of the error term between year s and year t.  We predict wages using 
the following methodology: 
( ) ( )
where
 = predicted wage for person i in year t  using the wage distribtion of year s
measured characteristics of the person at time t
the observed residual di
s
s it s itit
s
it
it
s
wage W X errorptile
wage
X
e
e
= +
=
= stribution function in the wage equation for year s
the observed percentile of the residual of person i in the year t wage equationiterrorptile =
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We use each person's characteristics in year t in the base year s wage equation.  To 
determine what the predicted error would be in the base year equation, we assume that the 
person's percentile ranking in the unexplained variance of wages remains unchanged in the 
two time periods.  Thus if the residual ite  for the person i in the year t wage equation placed 
them in the 37th percentile of the residual distribution, they would be assigned the residual of 
the 37th percentile of the distribution in year s.  This method thus preserves both the ranking 
of individual's unobserved components of earnings over time while adjusting for altered 
levels of unexplained variance in pay over time.   
A problem arises with those individuals for whom we do not observe a wage in year t.  
We chose to randomly assign a residual for these individuals from the year s residual 
distribution.  This methodology allows us to predict wages for all individuals in each year, 
whether they work or not, given the current year or base year wage equation.  
 
Work 
 
There are two components to our work specification; the participation decision and the choice 
of hours of work.  We treat these separately.  Firstly, we estimate an equation each year that 
describes whether an individual works on not: 
  
( , )
where
1ifperson i working in year t   =  
0 if person i not working in year t
measured characteristics of person i at time t as in the wage equation
measured household 
work L X Zit t it it it
workit
Xit
Zit
n= +
=
= characteristics of person i at time t
 
 
Xit is the same as specified above. itZ  includes the number of children, spouse’s education, 
and other non-labour, non-benefit income.  And, for women in couples, we also include their 
partner’s work status to account for covariance in work decisions of couples.  We estimate 
this equation separately for men and women and for individuals in different household types 
(husbands or wives, single household heads with other household members, single heads with 
no other members and other household members). 
We now want a prediction of the work status of person i in year t given the work 
specification of some base year s.  Our aim here in predicting work status in year t given the 
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work equation of year s is to change the status of as few people as possible from their actual 
status observed in year t.  Clearly, to the extent there are aggregate changes in work we need 
to adjust the work status of at least some individuals.  Hence we predict work status in the 
following way: 
( ) ( )
 If 0 and ( ) ( ) 0 and    then   1
1 ( )
( ) ( )
 If 1 and ( ) ( ) 0 and    then   0
( )
Ot
s tP work P work ss t it itwork P work P work U workitit it it i tP work it
t sP work P work ss t it itwork P work P work U workitit it it i tP work
it
-
= - > < =
-
-
= - < < =
herwise    
 predicted work status of person i in year t given year s work specification
  observed work status of person i in year t
( ) ( , ) is the predicted 
s
work workit it
s
workit
workit
sP work L X Z
it s it it
=
=
=
= work probability of person i in year t 
using the year s work equation
( ) ( , ) is the predicted work probability of person i in year t 
using the year t work equation
 is a uniformly dist
tP work L X Z
it t it it
Ui
=
ributed random number for person i
 
 
Thus to construct the predicted work status of person i in year t under the year s specification 
s
itwork , we apply the following procedure.  Initially we assign him a predicted work status 
that is equal to his observed work status.  We then compare his predicted probability of work 
in year t under the year t equation, ( )tP work it with that predicted by the year s equation, 
( )sP work it .  If for an individual, his ( )
sP work it  > ( )
tP work it  and the person is already 
working, we do nothing as predicted the odds of working have increased.  If the person is not 
now working (and 1- ( )tP work it  of such individuals will not be working), then there is some 
chance the person would in fact have gone to work.  To assure that the fraction working 
matches the predicted probabilities, we need to randomly assign some of the individuals who 
are not working into work based on the difference in their predicted work probabilities and 
the odds that the person is not now working.  This can be done on an individual basis using 
the equations above.  However, if ( )sP work it  < ( )
tP work it then we need to assign some 
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individuals who are working out of work.  Again we randomly assign a proportion of these 
workers out of work.  These proportions are specified such that the overall proportion in work 
in year t under the year s specification corresponds to that predicted by the year s work 
equation given year t characteristics. 
 
Hours 
 
Secondly, we estimate an hours equation for each year for those individuals with 
positive hours of work: 
 
( , )
where:
 hours worked by person i in year t (for  those with positive hours)
measured characteristics of the person at time t
measured household characteristics of pe
hours H X Zit t it it it
hoursit
Xit
Zit
h= +
=
=
= rson i at time t
 
 
Again we estimate this equation separately for men and women and for different 
household types (as discussed above).  In order to obtain a prediction of the work hours of 
person i in year t under the base year s equation we apply the same method as employed with 
wages. 
 
( ) ( )
where
 = predicted hours for person i in year t using the hours distribtion of year s
measured characteristics of the person at time t
measured household 
s
it s it s it
s
it
it
hours H X errorptile
hours
X
Zit
h= +
=
= characteristics of person i at time t
the observed residual distribution function in the hours equation for year s
the observed percentile of the residual of person i in the year t hours
s
iterrorptile
h =
=  equation
 
 
We use each person's individual and household characteristics in year t in the base 
year s hours equation.  To determine what the predicted error would be in the base year 
equation, we assume that the person's percentile ranking in the unexplained variance of hours 
remains unchanged in the two time periods.  For those who are not working in year t we 
randomly assign a residual from the year s residual distribution. 
 18
Benefits 
 
In our benefit specification we need to predict both whether a household is in receipt of 
benefits and the amount received.  Ideally we would like to have access to a benefit model 
that uses observed household characteristics to predict the amount of benefit entitlement.  In 
the absence of such a model we employ a regression based approach, using observed 
individual and household characteristics to predict benefit receipt.  As with work there are 
two components to our benefit specification.  Firstly we need to model whether the household 
is in receipt of benefits and then the benefit amount. 
 We estimate a benefit receipt equation for each household head i as follows: 
 
( , )
where
 1 if household  i is receiving benefits in year t =  0if household i is not receiving benefits in year t 
measured characteristics of household head i at time t
benp R X Yit t it it it
benpit
Xit
Yit
x= +
=
= measured characteristics of household i at time t
 
 
We estimate this equation separately for our different household types (see above).  
Yit includes own education dummies, spouse’s education dummies, own hours of work, 
spouse’s hours of work, number of adults, number of children, household earnings dummies, 
and non-wage income dummies.  For the US we also include the State maximum AFDC 
level, whether the head has a disability, and whether the head was a widow. 
We wish to predict the benefit participation of households in year t given a base year s 
benefit participation equation.  We employ an analogous methodology to that described 
above in terms of work participation. 
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( ) ( )
 If 0 and ( ) ( ) 0 and    then   1
1 ( )
( ) ( )
 If 1 and ( ) ( ) 0 and    then   0
( )
Ot
s tP benp P benp ss t it itbenp P benp P benp U benpitit it it i tP benp
it
t sP benp P benp ss t it itbenp P benp P benp U benpitit it it i tP benp
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-
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herwise    
 predicted benefit status of household head i in year t given year s benefit specification
  observed benefit status of household head i in year t
( ) (
s
ititbenp benp
s
benpit
benp
it
sP benp R Xit s
=
=
=
= , ) is the benefit participation probability of household head i in year t 
using the year s benefit equation
( ) ( , ) is the benefit participation probability of household head i in y
Zit it
tP benp R X Z
it t it it
= ear t 
using the year t benefit equation
 is a uniformly distributed random number for household head iUi
 
 
Benefit amounts 
 
Lastly we require a prediction of the monetary amount of benefit receipt for each year.  Our 
goal is to model as nearly as possible the mechanical relationship between a family’s earnings 
and other characteristics and the amount of benefits they receive.  Clearly the decision to 
work and the level of earnings that people have will be endogenous.  But conditional on work 
and earnings benefits are not endogenous, they are a function of the rules of the benefit 
regime.  In later work for Britain, we may use the IFS Taxben model to get more accurate 
estimates of benefit entitlement.  But we do not have such a model for the US and we seek to 
have as comparable a model as possible between the two countries.  We run the following 
regression for each household head separately for our different household types and also 
separately for households with and without children:   
 
( , )
where
benefit receipt of household head i at time t
measured characteristics of household head i at time t
measured characteristics of household i at time t
benefits B X Yit t it it it
benefitsit
Xit
Yit
y= +
=
=
=
 
 20
In order to obtain a prediction of benefit receipts of household head i in year t under 
the base year s equation we apply the same method as employed with wages and hours above. 
 
( , ) ( )
where
 = predicted benefits for hosehold head i in year t using the benefits distribtion of year s
measured characteristics household head i at tim
s
s it it s itit
s
it
it
benefits B X Y errorptile
benefits
X
y= +
= e t
measured household characteristics at time t
the observed residual distribution function in the benefits equation for year s
the observed percentile of the residual of household h
s
it
Zit
errorptile
y
=
=
= ead i in the year t benefits equation
 
We use each household head’s individual and household characteristics in year t in the base 
year s benefits equation.  To determine what the predicted error would be in the base year 
equation, we assume that the household's percentile ranking in the unexplained variance of 
benefits remains unchanged in the two time periods.  For those who are not in benefit receipt 
in year t we randomly assign a residual from the year s distribution. 
We now have a predicted wage, work status, hours, benefit status and receipt for 
every person in our sample in each year t.  In addition, we have a prediction in each year t 
given the wage, work and benefits specification of the base year s.  This allows us to answer 
questions such as; what would household income, and hence poverty, be in year t given the 
wage, work or benefit specification and residuals from year s. 
 
 
5.  Results:  the Forces Shaping Poverty in Great Britain and the United 
States 
 
With this methodology we can pose a blistering array of hypothetical “what-if” scenarios.  
What would happen to poverty if wages had remained as they were in 1979 (or in 1984 or 
any other year) but demographic, work, and benefit patterns had all evolved as they did in 
actuality?  What if the demographics only had changed?  We have chosen 1979 as our base 
year partly because it just precedes most of the burst of inequality and policy change in both 
countries.  We could have selected any year.  Our basic question is straightforward:  what 
factors caused the sharp changes in poverty? 
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We settled on an additive approach to understanding the changes.  We start with 
everything as it was in 1979, and add in one change at a time.  We begin by projecting what 
poverty would have been had demographic changes alone occurred. Methodologically, this 
involves estimating what work, wages, and benefits would have been in every year applying 
1979 models (with their residuals) to the actual characteristics of the population in each year.  
Because family structures, education, and ages would have changed over time, work, wages, 
and benefits would have changed somewhat and poverty would have been changed as well.  
The change in poverty created by this model is the estimated impact of demographics. Next 
we projected poverty with wages and demographics set to their actual levels while work and 
benefits were kept at their 1979 level.14  The change in poverty from the previously measured 
impact of demographics alone indicates the impact of altered wage patterns.  Next we 
calculated poverty allowing demographics, wages, and work to change, but still keeping 
government benefits at their 1979 base level.15  The net change in poverty now is the work 
effect.  Finally the change from this to actual poverty is the impact of changes in benefits.   
 This type of decomposition involves several critical assumptions.  The most obvious 
is that each change is being treated as though it were exogenous.  But, of course, 
demographic changes may, in part, be the result of wage or benefit changes.  Wage changes 
may be influenced by the fraction of people working.  Work patterns will surely be 
influenced by wage and benefit patterns.  These results thus must be seen as partial effects – 
not capturing any behavioural impacts.  The place where this is most at issue is the potential 
impact of government benefits on work and worklessness.  In the later sections of this paper, 
we shall confront this issue directly.  Here we do adjust benefits for altered earnings, but not 
vise versa. 
 The other obvious feature of using this additive approach is that the decomposition it 
yields is somewhat path dependent.  Depending on the order we added changes, the fraction 
attributed to various factors could differ.  In our experiments, the order makes surprisingly 
little difference, though the order in which work or wage changes are added makes some 
                                                 
14 For most persons we use their actual wage multiplied by their predicted work hours if conditions had 
remained as in 1979.  If some people were projected to work in a particular year who were not projected to work 
in 1979, we use an imputed wage for them. 
15  We actually estimated two effects.  First the projected poverty if benefits remained exactly at the level we 
predicted each family would have received in 1979 had their work and wages been as predicted using models 
for 1979.  Then we projected poverty after allowing for the fact that under 1979 rules, benefits would have 
adjusted to the changed economic situation.  This is the income stabilization effect of the benefit systems.  In 
these charts, the lines are shown assuming benefits were set at the 1979 levels when work and wages were also 
set in 1979.  Thus when we change wages or work we get the pure impact on poverty, not net of a stabilization 
effect. 
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difference in the UK because slightly more people are affected by wage changes when work 
levels are kept at 1979 levels.   
 Because we estimate changed outcomes for every member of our sample,  
we can report on a very wide range of impacts.  In each nation, we can look at effects on any 
possible measure of poverty for any demographic or family group.  Here we have chosen to 
report on relative and absolute poverty overall, and for four family subgroups:  couples with 
children, couples without children, singles with children, and singles without children.  Note 
the “singles without children” is not necessarily a household with only one member (for 
example, in a small number of cases it includes grown children or other adults).  With two 
nations, two poverty measures, and four family groupings, we have 16 different combinations 
to report about – and for each there is a different impact of demographics, wages, work, and 
public aid.  Obviously we will not be able to comment fully on each of these, and many 
detailed results are relegated to an appendix or available from the authors. 
 Figure 4 illustrates the various impacts on relative poverty in Britain.  It shows how 
each change would have altered poverty.  The impacts are also summarized in the first 
column of the top panel of Table 1.  The figure and table reveal a very straightforward and 
reasonable story.   
 
· Demographics, wage change, and increased worklessness all contributed 
considerably to growing relative poverty in Britain throughout the 1979 to 
1999 period.  Demographic changes alone pushed poverty from roughly 
13.0% up to 18.4%.  Wages moved the rate up another 4.6 points to 23.0%.  
Worklessness raised poverty another 5.1 points to 28.1%.  On the other hand, 
government benefits expanded over the period and, ignoring any behavioural 
impacts, reduced poverty to 24.4% – 3.7 points lower than it would have been 
in the absence of expansion. 
 
 We should point out that much of the increase in benefits was in the form of increased 
housing benefit arising from increased rents.  This is subject to interpretation and we will 
return to this below.  Also, it is worth noting that the role of worklessness was larger during 
the mid 1980s and mid 1990s when overall levels of unemployment were much higher.16   
Figure 5 and the second column of Table 1 shows the same information for absolute 
poverty, and a rather different picture emerges. 
 
                                                 
16   When we use the more standard definition of relative poverty based upon half mean contemporary income in 
Britain we find the role of work diminished and a larger impact from wages and demographic change.  Since 
mean wages have risen faster than median wages this will raise this alternative poverty threshold by more. 
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· In sharp contrast to relative poverty, neither demographic nor wage changes 
had a large net impact on absolute poverty.  Demographic changes alone 
would have pushed up absolute poverty from 13.0% to 14.2%.  Wage changes 
had a small impact of 0.7 points.  On the other hand, work changes had a very 
large impact on absolute poverty, pushing it up from 15% to over 21%.  
Indeed the only reason absolute poverty did not rise much over this period was 
a large increase in government aid which pushed absolute poverty down by 
almost 7 points below what it would have been. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 and the last two columns of Table 1 show similar decompositions of 
poverty for the US.  A very different pattern emerges. 
 
· Demographic and wage changes in the US had smaller impacts on relative 
poverty than in Great Britain.  On the other hand wages played a slightly 
larger role in raising absolute poverty in the US than in Britain.   
 
· And in very sharp contrast to Britain, work changes significantly reduced 
absolute poverty and slightly reduced relative poverty in the US.  And the 
direct effects of changes in government aid were almost negligible by 1999.  
(Figure 7 actually shows that in the mid 1980s policies increased poverty 
slightly, in the early 1990s they reduced it, and by 1999, the impact was 
roughly zero). 
 
In interpreting these results, one must again remember that what is being measured is 
the effect of benefit (or wage or work) changes on poverty changes.  The zero impacts for 
government benefits in Table 1 for the US does not mean that the level of government aid did 
not reduce poverty below what it would have been, only that changes in aid relative to 1979 
did not affect changes in poverty.  And indirect effects through behavioural changes remain 
to be considered. 
 The bottom four panels of Table 1 display a plethora of results showing the impact of 
various types of changes on poverty among sub-groups.  Even more detail is available in 
Appendix Tables A1-A4.  In reading these results, it is important to remember that the 
experiment being contemplated is changing demographics or wages for everyone, not just the 
sub-group.  A factor can have an effect on relative poverty of a group even if it does not 
affect the income of the group if it changes mean incomes overall and thus the poverty line.  
Thus the change in wages has large effects on relative poverty of single mothers (who do not 
work a great deal) because the higher overall mean wages result in a higher relative poverty 
standard which in turn leads more single mothers to be counted as poor.   
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 The many results in Table 1 are too numerous to summarize, but a few key points do 
stand out.   
 
· Among couples in Britain, work and pay changes are the big story:  Wage changes 
pushed up relative poverty significantly, work declines pushed up relative poverty 
somewhat and absolute poverty quite considerably.   
 
· Among couples in the US, work and wages are the story also, but in a different way.  
Wage changes did push up relative and absolute poverty somewhat, but work changes 
diminished both relative and absolute poverty. 
 
· For single parents, the most striking findings involve work and benefits.  In Britain, 
falling work pushes up poverty, especially absolute poverty while rising aid 
dramatically cuts poverty – reducing absolute poverty by an astonishing 27 
percentage points.  In the US, rising work of single parents apparently reduced 
absolute poverty a great deal, though this was partly offset by government benefit 
cuts.  But intriguingly the changes in work have virtually no impact on relative 
poverty. 
 
· For singles without children, in the UK, the story is again one of reduced work being 
offset by higher benefits.  In the US, neither of these factors appear to be important. 
 
· What seems to emerge overall, then, is a story where: 
 
Ø Demographic change pushed up poverty in both nations, but far more for 
relative than absolute poverty. 
Ø Changing wages pushed up relative poverty in both nations, but had a small 
impact on absolute poverty in Britain and only a modest negative impact on 
absolute poverty in the US. 
Ø Changing work patterns increased poverty in Britain and reduced it in the US, 
but in both countries the impacts are larger on absolute than relative poverty. 
Ø The direct effect of changing government benefits since 1979 was to reduce 
poverty considerably in Britain while having essentially no impact in the US. 
 
 
6.  Understanding How Demographic, Wage, and Work Changes 
Influenced Poverty 
 
These somewhat divergent results are actually quite plausible and fairly easy to understand.  
We examine each factor in turn briefly. 
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Demographics  
 
There were two major types of demographic change in both countries.  On the one hand two 
parent families diminished in proportion, being replaced by lone parents and singles without 
children.  The number of single parent households increased from about 5% to 12% in Britain 
and from about 12% to 15% in the US between 1979 and 1999.  As poverty rates are much 
higher in these settings, both absolute and relative poverty would be expected to rise as the 
mix shifted.   
At the same time, education levels rose significantly over the period.  The increased 
education would have been expected to push up wages and work (and our models do project 
modest rises if 1979 work models had remained in place).  This improvement in earnings 
would tend to reduce absolute poverty as more people moved above a fixed threshold.  But its 
impact on relative poverty is ambiguous at best, since it raises incomes across the board.  
Indeed educational change could act to increase relative poverty both because education rises 
could have been greater in the upper percentiles and because low percentile families are far 
less likely to be working and thus would not see the impact of any wage rise associated with 
higher education.   
 
· Changing demographics pushed up relative poverty due to altered family structures 
and rising education.  But demographic effects on absolute poverty reflect the 
partially offsetting forces of changing family structures and rising education. 
 
Wages 
 
The picture for wages in Britain has much the same flavor, unambiguous increases in relative 
poverty, offsetting forces for absolute deprivation.  Figures 8 and 9 show the well-known 
trends in wages for men and women in Great Britain using the FES.  Mean and median 
hourly wages rose sharply, but the distribution also spread considerably.  The striking fact on 
these figures is that wages for men and women in the 10th percentile rose only slightly over 
this period, particularly for men.  Relative poverty essentially measures inequality, so the 
widening distribution increased poverty regardless of the growth of the mean.  And since 
absolute poverty captures what is happening to incomes of people at the bottom, the fact that 
wages were essentially unchanged at the lower tail left absolute poverty essentially 
untouched.  In effect the beneficial effects of rising mean pay were offset by the negative 
impacts of a widening pay distribution. 
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 As shown on Figures 10 and 11, in the US, pay distributions also widened, but for 
men at least, there was no concomitant rise in mean pay.  Indeed the pay of men in the 10th 
percentile fell from $7.06 to $5.91 in 1993, before recovering somewhat to $6.36 by 1999.  
Such a change inevitably pushed up absolute poverty.  Women’s pay rose somewhat, but not 
enough at the bottom to offset the negative impacts of male earnings. 
 
· Rising wage inequality in both countries played a leading role in raising relative 
poverty.  But at the bottom of the distribution, stagnant pay in Britain and falling 
pay in the US meant that the absolute level of deprivation was unaffected in the 
former nation and worsened in the latter. 
 
Work 
 
Figure 12 plots the oft-cited rise in worklessness17 in the UK – reproducing the results of 
Gregg, Hansen and Wadsworth (1999a) and others.  For every family type worklessness has 
risen rather considerably since 1979.  This rise is quite remarkable since the unemployment 
rate is back down to where it had been in 1979 (as are overall employment rates) and wages 
are on average considerably higher.  Worklessness rose from 35% of single parent 
households in 1979 to 56% in 1999.  Among couples with children the rise was from 4.5% up 
to 7.3%, down from it’s peak of nearly 12% in 1992, but still considerably higher than 
previously.  In absolute terms the rises were greatest for single parents, but in percentage 
terms the rises were especially high for couples.   
The story for couples is somewhat more complex than it first appears.  On the one 
hand men in couples are working considerably less than they did in 1979 – non-work has 
risen from 7 to 13%, even among men with children.  Simultaneously work among women 
has grown even more dramatically.  The fraction of mothers working outside the home has 
jumped from 59% to 71%.  Figure 13 shows that while worklessness has risen, so too has the 
frequency of both men and women working within couples.  Gregg, Hansen and Wadsworth 
(1999a) report this redistribution of work into work rich and work poor households.  
Bifurcation of work within couples almost certainly contributed to a widening family income 
distribution. 
In many respects it is a puzzle that work changes did not increase poverty more, 
especially relative poverty.  Altered work did have large effects on absolute poverty.  It 
                                                 
17 For comparability with the US where young adults often live at home and work, we define worklessness as 
being where neither the household head nor the partner (if present) works. 
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appears that a large share of the newly workless poor would have previously been the 
working poor when one uses the higher relative poverty standard.   
Nothing like this occurred in the US.  Figure 14 shows that worklessness18 is on the 
decline, particularly among single mothers.  Less than 5% of husband-wife families with 
children are workless.  Among single parents, worklessness has fallen from a peak of 44% in 
1982 to its current level of 27%.  Naturally these patterns are relevant in explaining poverty 
patterns.   
Note, however, one very important fact – the impact of rising work in the US is felt 
mainly in absolute not relative poverty.  Increasing work by single parents sharply reduced 
absolute poverty, but had no impact on relative poverty.  The obvious reason must be that the 
move to work pushed single parent incomes up somewhat, but not high enough to get above 
the much higher relative poverty line.  From the vantage point of relative poverty, in the US 
large numbers of single parents have gone form the non-working poor to the working poor.   
 
· Work patterns were radically different in Britain and the US.  Worklessness is on 
the rise in all types of households in Britain, while it is falling sharply in the US, 
especially among single parents.  Interestingly, changes in work have large 
effects on absolute poverty in both countries, but much smaller impacts on 
relative poverty.  Moving people to work apparently moves their incomes up 
somewhat, but often not enough to avoid relative poverty. 
 
 
7.  The Role of Social Policies 
 
It is evident that in Britain and the US benefits changed over time.  These clearly influenced 
poverty, and they may be linked to changes in behaviour.  One would like to compare the 
benefit structures, but past efforts at comparison have illustrated just how difficult that can 
be.  The US has a set of overlapping programs often targeted to only a select group of 
beneficiaries, such as single parents (AFDC-TANF), the unemployed (UI), the disabled 
(SSI), working parents (EITC), widows (SSA-Survivors), as well as one fairly general 
support program called Food Stamps.  In Britain, though there are important distinctions 
between aid for the unemployed or disabled or for housing, the variations among these are 
quite small in comparison to the US.   
                                                 
18 In all calculations relating to work and worklessness, we use whether or not the person was working at the 
March survey date. If we defined work based on annual work hours (which drives our model for the US) it 
would not be comparable to FES data which is for a survey week. 
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Comparison is further complicated by the fact that much of what influences benefit 
receipt and participation, especially in the US, has to do with administrative procedures and 
the treatment of clients.  Benefit levels have not been cut dramatically in the US in recent 
years, but by all accounts the attempt to deter potential recipients from getting some forms of 
aid (in hopes of keeping them working) and the stigma of getting aid have increased 
significantly.  Sanctions have grown and other administrative tightening seems omnipresent. 
How then are we to compare the nature of support in the two nations over time?  Our 
benefit model provides a rather straightforward conceptual way of comparison.  For each 
country and for each family type, we can observe over time the amount of aid a 
family/household actually receives conditional on their earnings.  Thus one can see how 
much aid a couple with zero earnings receives in 1979, in 1989, in 1999 and compare the 
levels and trends across countries.  Similarly, one can compare the aid of couples with 
earnings of £1-£150, or earnings of £151-£300, etc.  Of course this is not perfect, because the 
households in each category are in part a selected group, so there is an element of 
endogeneity.  It is important to remember we are conditioning on earnings, and asking 
whether someone of a given earnings gets more benefits across countries and over time – 
certainly a well-defined question.  Still, persons who have some condition we do not capture 
in the model or observe in the data that allows them to qualify for added aid may be more 
likely to be workless, and thus the method could not fully reflect the true potential benefit 
that another worker without this unobserved condition would get.19  Nonetheless country 
differences and trends over time should be quite revealing. 
Let us begin be comparing the patterns for single parents because the differences are 
so striking.  Figure 15 shows the amount of benefits a single parent received on average by 
weekly earnings category.  For someone with zero earnings, benefits were roughly flat at 
£130 during most of the 1980s, then rose significantly during the 1990s to nearly £170 in 
1999.  As noted before about 65% of this increase was due to rising housing aid.  For 
someone earning from £1 to £150 per week, benefits averaged £95 and rose to £120 by 1999. 
                                                 
19 The extreme example of this situation would be a disability program which paid vastly higher benefits to the 
disabled, but that others could not qualify for.  Failing to control for disability might lead one to inappropriately 
predict that all persons with zero earnings would get high benefits, when in reality, only those with disabilities 
would.  Such a disability program does exist in the US.  However, we control for disability status in our model.  
And there is a bias in the other direction. Some people with zero earnings actually do not qualify for aid, either 
because the do not meet asset tests or because their zero earnings represent measurement error in the data.  
These persons would get zero benefits which would tend to pull the projected benefits for zero earners 
downward.   
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Compare this to the benefits in the US as shown in Figure 16.  In deriving these and 
the other charts for the US, we have excluded the disabled and widows who have quite 
generous programs of support, and who would distort the comparisons.  Comparison between 
weekly benefits in pounds in Britain and annual benefits in dollars in the US can be tricky.  In 
purchasing power parity terms, if one multiplies weekly benefits in pounds by roughly 80, 
one gets annual dollars.  Figure 16 is scaled so that the range is roughly equivalent in annual 
dollars of purchasing power parity to that of the British benefits.  Thus visual comparisons 
between them give a sense of generosity.  
Several facts stand out immediately in the US.  First, benefits for zero earners have 
fallen throughout this period, and the fall has been particularly dramatic in the past five years.  
This trend can be traced first to the fact that AFDC benefits were not indexed to inflation, and 
then to the effects of welfare reforms at both the state and national levels in the early to mid 
1990s.   
Second, benefits for those with moderate earnings – $7,500 to $15,000 – dipped 
considerably in the early 1980s, were flat until the early 1990s, and then rose sharply in 
recent years.  These former changes are the result of Reagan era cutbacks in aid to working 
poor families on AFDC, the latter the effects of the dramatic expansions in the Earned 
Income Tax Credit.  There is one mild puzzle here.  Benefits have begun to drift down again.  
This appears to be the result of reductions in food stamp and other benefits, for there have not 
been any statutory cuts at the national level.  In any case, by 1999, the difference in benefits 
for someone with zero earnings and someone earning up to $15,000 were small.   
Of particular relevance to the factors influencing poverty, the benefits for zero 
earnings are now considerably lower than in Britain, even though wages are often much 
higher in the US.  In purchasing power weekly equivalents, the US benefit for a zero earner is 
only £65 per week.20  Even the benefits of the 1980s were only the equivalent of £100.  Thus,  
 
· The benefit structures for single parents and the trends over time look 
dramatically different in the US and Britain.  In the US, benefits received by zero 
earning single parents have fallen dramatically in recent years and benefits to 
those with low to moderate incomes have risen sharply.  By contrast in Britain, 
                                                 
20 The sharp decline in the number of persons with zero earnings in the US probably causes this figure to be 
exaggeratedly low.  Some of the zero earners are probably data errors, or people with sizeable assets who 
qualify for no aid.  In the extreme case where one ignores all those getting zero benefits, the average benefit for 
a zero earner is $7200 down from $9,000 in the 80s, still vastly lower than the British benefit.  Moreover, one 
would generally expect a strong potential bias in the other direction among those getting aid.  Persons who could 
get the highest benefits should be more likely to have zero earnings. 
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benefits (largely due to rises in housing aid) have risen sharply for zero earning 
single parents and incentives for work have if anything worsened.  
 
· The average benefit for a zero earner single parent as a fraction of the current 
relative poverty standard for a family of three in Britain was 62% in 1999 and 
92% as a fraction of the absolute standard.  In the US, this observed benefit for a 
zero earning single parents is now just 19% of the relative poverty line and only 
36% of the US absolute poverty line.  With British benefits far closer to the 
poverty lines, especially for absolute poverty, it should come as no surprise that 
benefit expansions had a relatively large impact on single parent poverty, 
particularly absolute poverty, in Britain, while benefit changes had much smaller 
impacts on poverty rates in the US. 
 
Given the sharp difference in the trends in benefits and incentives between the two 
nations, it is at least plausible that benefit structures are influencing the divergent patterns of 
work, and we consider that issue in the next section. 
But before looking at the question of behavioural impacts, we examine benefit 
patterns for other groups.  Figures 17 and 18 show benefits for couples with children in Great 
Britain and the US.  The British patterns show a rise in benefits for those with zero and low 
earnings in the early 80s, then a flattening in the mid 80s, perhaps because the indexing 
system was changed.  Whereas previously benefit increases were indexed to wage increases 
or price rises they were now tied to only price increases – and thus just kept pace with 
inflation.  In the late 80s a variety of housing benefit changes were implemented that reduced 
such aid.  In particular, a capital limit of £6000 was introduced before an individual could 
qualify.  See Evans (1996) for an excellent review.  These probably account for the benefit 
falls of the mid to late 80s.  Finally in 1986 the Social Security Act introduced wide-ranging 
reforms to the benefit system.  The aim was to simplify the benefit system and to provide 
greater rewards to work.  Supplementary Benefit was replaced by the simpler Income 
Support, which varied by just age and family structure. Family Credit replaced Family 
Income Supplement in providing a supplement for low income working families with 
children and was more generous than its predecessor.  During this period benefits begin to 
rise again – about half due to housing aid expansion as rents rose and capital limits were 
increased. 
In the US benefits for couples are far lower and show far less change over time, 
though the changes vaguely mimic the patterns for single parents in that less and less aid is 
available for those with zero earnings and more is being offered for those with low to 
moderate earnings.  Still the striking feature of this figure is just how much lower benefits are 
for couples in the US.  One seeming peculiarity in the US data can be readily explained.  In 
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years of recession the average benefits received by zero and low earning couples tends to 
jump up.  That is because a group of former workers becomes unemployed and then quality 
for short-term (26 – 38 weeks) unemployment benefits. 
 
· Benefits for couples differ considerably between the US and Britain as well.  
British aid for low and zero earning families is considerably more generous and 
has become more so over time.  In the US, even couples with zero earnings 
average just $4,000-$5,000 in aid or the purchasing power equivalent of £50-65 
per week.  In Britain, couples with zero earnings now average £160 per week.  It 
seems no wonder that in Britain, expanding aid has had a far larger role in 
reducing poverty. 
 
The patterns of US/British differences persist when we examine aid for single adults 
(not shown): 
 
· In Britain benefits for single adults with zero earnings have also risen 
significantly over time.  And in the US, aid to non-disabled single adults is 
almost non-existent.  
 
We now turn to the most difficult question.  What if any effects have these benefit 
structures had on behaviour? 
 
Behavioural effects of aid  
 
There are several strategies that are commonly followed to determine the impact of benefits 
and benefit changes on work.  The first is to attempt to try to calculate the actual level of 
benefits for which each family could qualify using measures of benefit levels, eligibility 
rules, effective tax rates and the like and treat these parameters as exogenous.  One would 
then use these in a structural model of labour supply behaviour.  There is a long history of 
such modeling in work in both Britain and US.21   
The difficulty of such methods when examining overall poverty patterns is that the 
wide range of often interacting benefits is difficult to model.  Moreover, elements such as 
stigma, administrative complexity, and hostility/supportiveness of providers that sharply 
influence take-up rates severely complicate structural models.  In the US the recent changes 
have proven particularly hard to model (Ellwood, 2000).   
                                                 
21 See for example Bingley and Walker (1997); Blundell et al., (1999); Attanasio and MaCurdy (1997) and 
Moffitt (1986). 
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A second strategy is to include a variety of measures of the structure of benefits, such 
as maximum benefit amounts, tax rates, indicators of sanction regimes or time limits, and the 
scope of the EITC in a reduced form labour supply equation along with wages.  Meyer and 
Rosenbaum (1999), Eissa and Hoynes (1999), and Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) all offer 
good recent examples in the US.   
A final strategy is to compare behaviour over time of groups of people whose 
incentives have been differentially affected by altered policy.  Typically this work uses 
difference in difference techniques to look for evidence that the policy had an impact.  This 
strategy, or variations on it, has been used by Eissa and Liebman (1996) and many others.  
One variation on this technique used by Ellwood (2000) is to examine the changed incentives 
and track the work behaviour of people at different parts of a predicted wage distribution.  
Often policies only affect low potential earners, and thus differential work behaviour can be 
tied to changes in policy. 
Our imprecise methods for estimating benefits and the enormous differences across 
countries largely preclude our use of the first two strategies.  But we can at least use the 
models to gain a rough sense of how work incentives have changed over time in each country 
for people in different family settings who have differing potential wages and compare these 
to changes in work. 
This methodology is discussed in detail in Ellwood (2000), so we will only briefly 
describe it here.  We begin by predicting wages – this time without residuals – for everyone 
in our sample according to the 1979 wage model.  We then use these predicted wages to 
break people into thirds in each year, separately for men and women.  Thus regardless of 
whether people worked or not we have a predicted wage third.  We can then track incentives 
and work for people in those thirds.  Wage thirds make more sense than say, educational 
levels, because the fraction with a given educational level changes considerably over time.  
We use the 1979 model for creating the wage thirds in each year to ensure that we really are 
tracking a comparable group over time, not following different people as returns to education 
and other variables shift.   
Simple economic theory suggests that two factors ought to influence work decisions:  
first the level of income/benefits the person would get in the absence of work – a pure income 
effect, and the gain they would get by working – a substitution effect.  We have already 
observed what happens to the benefits of persons and families with zero earnings:  they rose 
over time in Britain for all family types, and benefits were considerably higher than in the 
US.  In the US benefits for non-workers fell over time, particularly for single parents.  Thus 
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based on the income effect alone one would expect work to fall in Britain and rise in the US.  
But the substitution effect – the gain to working also matters.  Wages have risen in Britain 
(although less so in entry jobs), and benefit structures changed.  It is possible that the gains to 
working have increased considerably as wages have gone up. 
We used our model to get a rough sense of how the gains to work may have changed 
over time and across countries.  For each person in the sample, we first predicted their 
potential wage if they worked using the wage equation of their sample year.  Once again we 
do not project residuals to avoid some forms of selection bias.  We then use our benefits 
models to predict what benefits the household would get if the person did not work, and what 
would be received if the person worked full time at the predicted wage.22  To simplify this 
analysis, we looked only at work behaviour of the heads and partners for this work – the 
income of others was taken as given.  For couples, we estimated benefits under a variety of 
joint work assumptions.23 
Finally we calculated a very simple predicted gain to work from earnings less benefit 
changes.  We did so by adding the gain in earnings to the predicted benefits given this level 
of earnings and then subtracting the benefits they would have gotten had they not worked.  
This gain to work is decidedly not a full measure of the returns to working.  We take no 
account of child care costs, work expenses, or income or payroll taxes in the two countries.  
But we do at least have a sense of how the gains from work due to earnings plus benefit 
offsets have changed over time. 
Single Parents – We again start by looking at single parents.  We have already seen 
that benefits for those with zero earnings rose quite significantly over time in Britain and fell 
precipitously in the US.  What happened to the gains to work from earnings less benefit 
changes?  Figures 19 and 20 show the results for Britain and the US by predicted wage third.  
Once again we see large differences: 
 
· For British single mothers, the predicted gain in earnings less benefit changes 
from entering work has risen over time somewhat, primarily because of rising 
wages.  But the gain from work for women in the bottom third of predicted wages 
                                                 
22 Note the predicted wage used to determine benefits is based on the equation for that year.  The predicted wage 
used to classify people into potential wage thirds is based on the 1979 model. 
23 Note that this methodology could over-predict the potential wage for those who do not actually work since 
those not working are more likely to have a negative wage residual.  Gregg, Johnson and Reed 1999b use "entry 
wages" for different groups of workers to model the expected wage.  But since we are looking at potential gains 
to work for workers at different levels of education and age, the entry level wage is not appropriate for use here.  
Additionally, entry jobs have increasingly become part time, and many of these would not be entry level 
workers if they worked. 
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has risen from just £57 to £89 per week.  And this ignores the costs of child care, 
work expenses, and taxes.  Even for single mothers in the top third, the gains 
from work average £200 per week – or the US equivalent of less than $16,000 
per year. 
 
· For single mothers in the US the gains in earnings less benefit changes from 
working are significantly higher and they have risen dramatically.  In percentage 
terms gains were particularly great for single mothers in the lowest third, though 
in absolute terms they were greater for women in the top third.  The gain (from 
earnings and benefits alone) for single mothers in the bottom third rose roughly 
$4,500 since 1993 (British equivalent of £60 per week).  Single mothers in the 
top third stand to gain nearly $30,000. 
 
Again we emphasize that these gains are not the whole story.  But adding other 
elements would if anything make things more dramatic.  In the US, Ellwood (2000) 
calculates that the returns to working after taking out child care costs and taxes and adding in 
other benefits such as aid for child care, has risen from under $2,000 to over $7,000.  The 
change in returns is quite close to what is predicted here, but the starting levels are lower due 
to accounting for other expenses. 
Combining the effects of vastly higher benefits when not working and continuing low 
returns to work, one would presumably expect work to decline among single mothers in 
Britain, especially at the bottom.  In the US one would expect to see the reverse.  Figures 21 
and 22 show that the predictions are borne out, though not perfectly. 
 
· Consistent with changed work incentives, single parents in Britain are working 
less, those in the US working more.  Consistent with theory, gains in work are 
particularly great among low wage single parents in the US.  One puzzle, 
however, is that in Britain, work declines were about as large for people in all 
three wage thirds.  One would generally expect social policies to have their 
greatest impact for those with the least earning potential.   
 
Couples – The work incentives for couples are a bit more complicated because there 
are four different combinations of work and non-work for the partners – more if one allows 
for part-time work.  Rather than focus on all of these, we shall present only two:  the gains in 
earnings plus benefit changes if the man goes to work full time and the woman is not 
working, and the gains from work if the woman works full time when the husband is already 
working full time.  Obviously the other combinations are plausible too, but this gives the 
rough incentives for families considering sending one or two people into the labour market.   
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Figures 23 and 24 show the gains to sending the man into full time work in an 
otherwise workless household in Britain and the US.  Once again we find striking differences.  
As always, scales are roughly equilibrated to purchasing power equity. 
 
· There are very large differences by country in the gains to working for a man if 
he is to be the only worker in a joint household.  In the US even someone in the 
bottom wage third can expect to see gains in earnings and benefits of close to 
$17,000 per year (£217 per week) and this has risen somewhat in recent years.  In 
Britain the gain is just £82 per week and this amount has fallen sharply since the 
early 1990s.  Even those in the middle third stand to gain just £130 (US $10,200) 
from a full time job.  In the US, with lower benefits and higher median wages, 
workers in the middle stand to gain nearly $25,000 in earnings less any benefit 
changes.   
 
Given the rising aid for those not working and low and declining returns for those in 
the bottom third, one would anticipate declines in work by men in Britain and if anything 
increases in work in the US.  Figures 25 and 26 show the actual patterns. 
 
· Work by men in couples is clearly cyclical, but consistent with altered incentives, 
work declined overall among men in Britain, particularly among men in the 
lowest third.  And work among husbands with children rose in the US.24  Still we 
again see the result that declines in work were sizeable even among those in the 
highest wage categories in Britain. 
 
One puzzle in the British data is why work by female partners is rising rapidly while 
work by male partners is declining.  Figures 27 and 28 give some hint as to why that might be 
occurring.  If most of the women entering the labour market are in homes where the man is 
already working, these are families already getting relatively low benefits, so the decision to 
work is primarily a question of what can be earned net of child care and work expenses. 
 
· In Britain, the gains from sending a second worker into the labour market are 
much higher than for sending the first worker.  Whereas a man in the bottom 
tercile who is the first earner in a household gained just £82, a woman who is the 
second earner in such settings would gain over £150 per week even though her 
gross pay is lower.  In the US a comparable woman in the bottom third would 
gain perhaps $14,000 (£180).  Women in higher wage thirds gain considerably 
more and the gains have been growing over time. 
 
                                                 
24 The rise in work in the US is all the more remarkable since disability programs expanded and work by men 
overall did diminish somewhat. 
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Actually this example does illustrate some limits to our admittedly rather imprecise 
methodology.  Others have shown that returns to work for women at the bottom have fallen 
somewhat in recent years due to the Earned Income Tax Credit whereas this analysis shows 
things to be unchanged. 
Figures 29 and 30 indicate work patterns of women in couples. 
 
· Consistent with observed incentives, women in couples are working more in both 
nations.  In Britain the rise is particularly notable among women at the bottom – 
in contrast to the increasing worklessness for all other groups.  By contrast, work 
by US wives in the bottom third leveled off in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
unlike the pattern for wives in higher wage categories.  Both of these patterns are 
roughly consistent with observed changes in incentives. 
 
Of course there are many other reasons why women may be working more, including 
changing attitudes and expectations.  Still what is striking is that trends among women in 
couples in the Britain and the US are broadly similar, but differ in specifics in ways 
consistent with incentives.  In Britain, the lowest wage women increased work the most.  In 
the US, they increased it the least.  And in both cases, their behaviour defies the patterns of 
all other low wage groups in the country.  In Britain where all other low skill workers are 
working less, low skill wives are working more.  In the US, where others are working more, 
low skill wives have not increased their work.  The results reinforce findings from Gregg, 
Hansen and Wadsworth (1999a) which suggest that the increasing polarization of work 
within couples in Britain may be related to features of the social benefit system that create 
weak work incentives among families with no workers, and relatively strong incentives for a 
second earner when one person is already working.   
Singles Without Children – Finally we examined work incentives and work 
behaviour in the two nations (not shown).   
 
· In general the returns to working seem to have changed little for single adults in 
the two nations.  But the sharp rise in benefits for those with no earnings (the 
income effect) in Britain coupled with no change in the gains to working would 
be expected to reduce work by singles in the bottom third.  That is precisely the 
pattern on finds in the British data.  
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Conclusions Regarding Behavioural Results – Our examination of the broad trends 
in work incentives suggest that they may explain an important part of the divergent trends in 
the US and Britain.   
 
· In general, incentives to work were always stronger in the US, and particularly 
for single parents they have recently become much stronger.  By contrast 
incentives for work in Britain have generally weakened over time – benefits for 
non-workers have risen, gains to work have fallen in some cases and been stable 
in others.  There is one exception:  gains to work by second earners have 
increased somewhat.  And wives are the only group working more in Britain.  
Still declining work even among the highest potential wage group suggests that 
more than just work incentives are operating here. 
 
 
8.  Reducing Poverty:  Potential and Limits of Work Based Strategies 
 
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government committed itself to reducing child poverty by half 
over the next 10 years and to its abolition within 20 years.  A central element of this effort 
has included a series of policy initiatives designed to encourage work and to “make work 
pay.”  The main changes in Britain are the introduction of the Working Families Tax Credit 
(WFTC), which provides generous support for low income working families and includes a, 
potentially very generous, child care element, the National Minimum Wage, reform of the 
National Insurance system, the introduction of a 10% starting rate of income tax and the 
National Childcare Strategy. These policies have been combined with various New Deal 
policies, most of which impose participation in work or training as a condition of benefit 
receipt.  Furthermore, benefits to all families with children, regardless of work status, have 
become more generous with real increases in child benefit and income support and the 
introduction of the Child Tax Credit. 
Table 2 helps to illustrate the larger themes of this paper, and points to the potential 
and the limits of work-based policies as a central element in reducing child poverty.  The 
table shows the distribution of poor children by total work hours of everyone in the 
household.  The first column shows that currently over half of poor children are in homes 
where no one is working, and only a third are in homes where people are working 30 hours or 
more.   
 
· Unless demographic, economic, or policy change induces more parents of 
children to work, the only way to reduce poverty by 50% would be to reduce 
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poverty among non-working families.  Absent behavioural change, added support 
for working families will still leave the majority of poor children poor. 
 
The chart also shows what would happen to child poverty if one could magically 
return to the work levels of 1979, but retained the wage and demographic patterns of 1999.  
The percentage of children in poverty in the current setting and under this scenario can be 
seen in the second and fourth columns.  The overall poverty rate would fall from 34.5% to 
29.1%.  Impressively the share of all children who are poor and in homes where no one is 
working would fall from 17.6% to 11.0%.  But overall poverty would not fall as much 
because the number of children in working poor families would rise.  One can see that the 
percentage of all children who are poor and living in families with more than 30 work hours, 
would rise from 11.3% to 14.5%. 
 
· Work changes alone are unlikely to dramatically reduce poverty of chilren.  Even 
if work levels could be restored to those of 1979, continuing low pay would leave 
many children poor.  Many families would move from being the workless poor to 
the working poor.  Poverty would only fall by 5 percentage points (out of 35%).25 
 
But if many more people were induced to work and work were made to pay, the goal 
of reducing child poverty by half might be achieved.  In the fourth column of Table 2, one 
can infer that if work were at the 1979 levels and if those who would otherwise be poor in 
families with 30 hours of work or more were removed from poverty, only 14.6% of all 
children would remain poor (the 11.0% in families that would still not be working and the 
3.6% in families with 1-29 work hours). 
 
· If work could be increased back to the 1979 levels, and if work was made to pay 
sufficiently so that no family with 30 hours of work was left poor, then poverty 
among children could fall from its current level of roughly 35% to approximately 
15%, achieving the goal of a 50% reduction in poverty.  If the make work pay 
policies reduced poverty among those who were working part time as well, 
poverty could fall still further. 
 
Thus, at least theoretically, a work-based strategy could significantly reduce poverty 
among children.  Still this table assumed that work levels that prevailed in the late 1970s 
                                                 
25 Other evidence in support of this conclusion comes from the US experience where rising work had very small 
effects on relative poverty.  It did have large effects on absolute poverty, because the absolute poverty standard 
is so much lower in the US. 
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could somehow be restored and that work really could be made to pay enough to keep 
families out of poverty.  Is that level of change really feasible? 
Clearly the US has successfully raised work among low income families, notably 
single parents.  But the differences in the US and UK benefit systems are enormous.  Single 
parents in Britain with zero earnings get benefits equivalent to just 62% of the relative 
poverty standard.  The US pays just 19%!  Two parent families and single adults without 
children get even less.  To mimic the financial work incentives in the US, benefits for non-
working families would have to be cut enormously for all families while maintaining aid for 
working ones.  And of course, cuts in benefits for non-workers will surely raise poverty or 
increase hardship among those with little or no earnings.   
Alternatively, aid for working families could be expanded dramatically, while 
maintaining support for non-working families.  This would also help in ensuring that working 
families avoid poverty.  Dilnot and McCrae (1999) show that WFTC is well targeted as a 
redistributive tool, with most gains going to households in the 2nd decile of the income 
distribution.  Unfortunately increases in in-work benefits of the sort enacted to date with the 
WFTC seem unlikely to change work incentives to the extent seen in the US, especially if the 
change in policy is largely offset by housing benefit changes, as Blundell and Hoynes (this 
volume) seem to suggest.  The gap in income for workers and non-workers is simply too 
limited, and the recent increases in benefits to all families with children may induce adverse 
income effects on labour supply.  If the WFTC were greatly expanded, costs may rise sharply 
or benefits will need to be phased-out  so rapidly for working families above the poverty line 
that this will create another set of adverse incentives.  Still, that may be a promising domain 
for further reforms. 
The US example may again be instructive.  The US spends more now on in-work 
benefits than it ever did on cash based benefits for the non-working poor.  The gain from 
going to work has increased considerably.  Benefits paid are large enough to pull families 
with 4 or fewer members and a full-time minimum-wage worker over the US absolute 
poverty line of $17,356.  But benefits are nowhere near enough to push people above a 
relative poverty line that exceeds $30,000.  In Table 1 we saw that increased work lead to 
reduced absolute poverty, but little change in relative poverty.  Some observers believe it will 
be difficult fiscally and politically to increase in-work benefits a great deal more in the US, 
and economists are increasingly worried about the adverse incentives created as benefits 
phase-out when people move toward the middle class.   
 40
Of course if the underlying pattern of wages could be made more equal, work might 
increase and poverty would fall.  Altering the underlying distribution of wages would require 
rapid and effective intervention to narrow differences in skills and opportunity – and even 
that may not narrow wages too much.26 
One might hope that moving people into the labour market will lead to rising 
experience and with that higher wages and ultimately to less relative poverty.  Keeping 
people working steadily rather than episodically might narrow the wage distribution 
somewhat.  But recent work by Burtless (forthcoming), Gottschalk (2000) and others 
suggests that wages rise even less with experience for low skill workers than for others.  
Dickens (2000) work on mobility and Stewart (1999) on the low pay – no pay cycle offer a 
similar caution.  Indeed, individuals are likely to require some form of in-work support or 
training that enables them to progress into better jobs. 
The final strategy would be to find some way to reverse some of the demographic 
changes, particularly in family structure.  Here the US has virtually no lessons to offer.  There 
are few clear policy strategies that successfully reduce the incidence of single parent families.  
Although there are some signs that recent increases in work among single parents in Britain 
may be partly due to a changing composition of this group. 
And difficult as it might be to halve poverty through work based strategies, it will be 
even harder to move toward complete elimination.  Under almost any plausible scenario, a 
great many workless households will still remain, so even dramatic expansions of in-work 
benefits will probably not pull down poverty rates enough to meet the governments goal of 
halving poverty.  One could also seek to raise benefits for all low income families with 
children with larger child credits and similar schemes.  Piachaud and Sutherland (2000) argue 
that measures of this type introduced by the Blair government are likely to have a significant 
impact on non-working poor families. The difficulty with this strategy is that one is likely to 
dampen down the increased work incentives.  Such a policy of increasing support to non-
working families, while creating strong incentives may prove to be very costly, since it 
inevitably runs into the basic dilemma of reform – a high guarantee and strong work 
incentives implies a very high break-even point so benefits are collected by a very large 
portion of the population.   
There are other ways to increase work beyond the use of financial incentives.  In the 
US and to a lesser degree in the UK, there is a move towards requiring work (in government 
                                                 
26 See Devroye and Freeman (2000).  
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subsidised jobs if necessary) as a condition of aid for some persons, while providing more 
generous aid to those not expected to work in an attempt to deal with this dilemma.  But such 
policies raise difficult value laden issues of determining who is expected to work and 
determining penalties when they do not do so.  We suspect that the changed attitudes and 
expectations of welfare workers and the public at large has had every bit as much to do with 
the rise in work among single parents as financial incentives have in the US.  British 
policymakers may need to pursue both sharp improvements in incentives and various 
administrative policies if they are really determined to increase work and reduce poverty. 
This discussion should not be seen as pessimistic about the potential for work-based 
strategies to reduce poverty.  But only a combination of strategies that dramatically increase 
work and increase the pay of low wage parents seems likely to change things dramatically.  
And absent ways to narrow wage differentials or change family structures, sharply reducing 
poverty will prove a formidable and expensive challenge. 
 
Concluding thoughts  
 
This paper has provided a strategy for decomposing the factors influencing poverty in Britain 
and the United States.  Striking similarities and differences are at work in the two nations.  
Demographic and wage change is a dominant force in both nations.  Work is falling among 
many low wage groups in Britain but rising on the other side of the Atlantic.  Social policies 
increased incomes but may have reduced work in Britain, and they may have done the 
opposite in the US.   
The paper also suggests the potential for detailed cross-national examinations.  The 
notion that the economic incentives built into policy are influencing outcomes within a nation 
are reinforced in this paper by the fact that when incentives differ in the two countries, so too 
do work patterns.  And one can see far more clearly than most casual observers realize that 
social policies are often profoundly different.  Ultimately, the hard work of policy analysis 
will probably remain a within-border affair.  But understanding the larger forces shaping 
poverty in several nations helps to illustrate both the potential and the limits of policies to 
reduce it. 
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Figure 1
Alternative Measures of Relative Poverty in Britain
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Figure 2
Relative Poverty in Britain and US
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Figure 3
Absolute Poverty in Britain and US
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Figure 4
Components of Change in Relative Poverty in Britain Since 1979
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Figure 5 
Components of Change in Absolute Poverty in Britain Since 1979
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Year
F
ra
ct
io
n
 P
o
o
r
Actual Poverty: Benefit, Work, Wage, and Demographic Change
Work, Wage, and Demographic Change
Wage and Demographic Change Only
Demographic Change Only
 45
 
 
 
 
Figure 6
Components of Change in Relative Poverty in the US Since 1979
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Figure 7 
Components of Change in Absolute Poverty in the US Since 1979
Using Official Standard
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Figure 8
Real Wages in Britain for Males Working at Least Half Time
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Figure 9 
Real Wages in Britain for Females Working at Least 
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Figure 10
Real Wages in the US for Males Working at Least Half Time
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Figure 11
Real Wages in the US for Females Working at Least Half Time
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Figure 12
Percent Workless Households in Britain
By Type Of Household
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Figure 13 
Work Patterns of Men and Women in Couples in Britain
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Figure 14 
Percent Workless* Households in the US
By Type Of Household
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Figure 15
Benefits for Singles With Children in Britain
By Weekly Earnings Category
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Figure 16
Benefits for Single Adult Headed Households in the US
(Non-disabled, Non-widowed) By Annual Earnings Category
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Figure 17
Benefits for Couples With and Without Children in Britain
By Earnings Category
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Figure 18
Benefits for Husband Wife Households in the US (Non-disabled, Non-widowed)
By Annual Earnings Category
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Figure 19
Predicted Gain in Earnings Less Benefit Changes for Full-Time Work:
Single Parents in Britain By Predicted Wage Class*
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Figure 20
Predicted Gain in Earnings Less Benefit Changes for Full-Time Work:
Single Parents in the US By Predicted Wage Class*
$0
$5,000
$10,000
$15,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$35,000
1978 1983 1988 1993 1998
Year
A
n
n
u
al
 G
ai
n
 in
 E
ar
n
in
g
s 
L
es
s 
B
en
ef
it
 
C
h
an
g
es
Predicted Wages in Bottom Third
Predicted Wages in Top Third
Predicted Wages in Middle Third
*Terciles of all men or of all women based on predicted wages (1979 models) in each year 
 53
 
 
 
Figure 21
Percentage Working Among Singles With Children in Britain
By Predicted Wage Third*--Three Year Centered Moving Averages
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Figure 22
Percentage Working Among Singles With Children in the US
By Predicted Wage Third*
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Figure 23 
Predicted Gain in Earnings Less Benefit Changes for Full-Time Work:
Men in Couples with Children  in Britain By Predicted Wage Class*
Assuming Their Partner is Not Working
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Figure 24 
Predicted Gain in Earnings Less Benefits Changes for Full-Time Work:
Husbands with Children in the US By Predicted Wage Class*
Assuming the Wife is Not Working
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Figure 25 
Percentage Working Among Males in Couples with Children in Britain
By Predicted Wage Third*--Three Year Centered Moving Averages
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Figure 26 
Percentage Working Among Husbands with Children in the US 
By Predicted Wage Third*
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Figure 27
Predicted Gain in Earnings Less Benefit Changes for Full-Time Work:
Women in Couples with Children  in Britain By Predicted Wage Class*
Assuming Partner Already Works Full-Time
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Figure 28
Predicted Gain in Earnings Less Benefit Changes for Full-Time Work:
Wives with Children in US By Predicted Wage Class*
Assuming Husband Already Works Full-Time
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Figure 29
Percentage Working Among Women in Couples With Children in Britain 
By Predicted Wage Third*--Three Year Centered Moving Averages
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Figure 30
Percentage Working Among Wives With Children in the US 
By Predicted Wage Third*
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Relative 
Poverty
Absolute 
Poverty
Relative 
Poverty
Absolute 
Poverty
  ALL PERSONS
Poverty in 1979 13.0% 13.0% 26.2% 10.4%
+ Demographics +5.4% +1.2% +3.3% +1.2%
+ Wages +4.6% +0.7% +1.3% +1.2%
+ Work Patterns +5.1% +6.3% -0.8% -2.3%
+ Government Benefits -3.7% -6.8% +0.0% +0.3%
= Poverty in 1999 24.4% 14.5% 30.0% 10.9%
  Couples With Children
Poverty in 1979 13.1% 13.1% 23.4% 6.4%
+ Demographics +2.7% -2.2% +2.7% +0.8%
+ Wages +5.3% +0.8% +2.2% +1.4%
+ Work Patterns +3.8% +5.4% -1.7% -2.4%
+ Government Benefits -2.3% -3.4% +0.1% +0.0%
= Poverty in 1999 22.6% 13.7% 26.8% 6.4%
  Couples Without Children
Poverty in 1979 3.5% 3.5% 9.5% 2.5%
+ Demographics +0.9% +0.3% +2.3% +0.4%
+ Wages +2.8% +0.4% +0.7% +0.3%
+ Work Patterns +3.7% +3.7% -0.5% -0.3%
+ Government Benefits -1.9% -3.1% -0.3% -0.0%
= Poverty in 1999 9.0% 4.9% 11.7% 2.8%
  Singles With Children
Poverty in 1979 48.3% 48.3% 63.9% 36.9%
+ Demographics +11.9% +2.5% -2.3% -5.1%
+ Wages +6.9% +0.8% -0.6% +2.3%
+ Work Patterns +8.4% +12.0% -0.2% -6.5%
+ Government Benefits -10.9% -26.5% +0.3% +1.4%
= Poverty in 1999 64.7% 37.2% 61.1% 29.0%
  Singles Without Children
Poverty in 1979 13.3% 13.3% 26.6% 15.0%
+ Demographics +3.8% +1.0% +2.6% +0.3%
+ Wages +2.7% +0.2% +0.9% +0.9%
+ Work Patterns +10.5% +10.6% +0.7% -0.5%
+ Government Benefits -6.5% -10.2% -0.1% +0.4%
= Poverty in 1999 23.9% 15.0% 30.8% 16.0%
Great Britain United States
Table 1
Decomposition of Changes in Poverty Between 1979 and 1999 by Family Type
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Table 2 
Distribution of Poor Children by Work Hours of Family: 
Actual 1999 and Projected if Work Patterns Were Comparable to 1979 
 
Actual Patterns in 1999 
Projections if Work Patterns in 
1999 had been comparable to 
those of 1979 Total Hours 
Worked By All 
Persons in the 
Household 
% distribution 
of poor 
children by 
work hours of 
the family. 
children who are 
poor and living in 
families with 
given work hours 
as a percentage 
of all children 
% distribution 
of poor 
children by 
work hours of 
the family. 
children who are 
poor and living in 
families with 
given work hours 
as a percentage 
of all children 
No Work Hours 51.1% 17.6% 37.7% 11.0% 
1-29 hours 16.1% 5.5% 12.4% 3.6% 
30 hours and over 32.8% 11.3% 49.9% 14.5% 
All Work Levels 100.0% 34.5% 100.0% 29.1% 
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Figure A1 
Components of Change in Absolute Poverty in the US Since 1979
Using 60% Median 79 Income Standard
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Demographic 
Changes
Demographic 
and Wage 
Changes
Demographic, 
Wage and Work 
Changes
Actual Poverty: 
Demographic, 
Wage, Work and 
Benefit Changes
  Couples With Children
1979 13.1% 13.1% 13.1% 13.1%
1984 11.3% 10.8% 20.0% 18.7%
1989 11.3% 10.7% 15.3% 14.9%
1994 12.3% 13.9% 21.6% 19.9%
1999 10.9% 11.7% 17.1% 13.7%
  Couples Without Children
1979 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
1984 3.3% 3.5% 8.5% 7.0%
1989 2.4% 2.6% 6.8% 4.9%
1994 2.5% 3.0% 9.6% 7.1%
1999 3.8% 4.3% 8.0% 4.9%
  Singles With Children
1979 48.3% 48.3% 48.3% 48.3%
1984 48.7% 51.7% 62.9% 53.2%
1989 46.8% 47.5% 59.4% 50.2%
1994 48.9% 47.5% 65.1% 51.1%
1999 50.9% 51.7% 63.7% 37.2%
  Singles Without Children
1979 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3%
1984 14.3% 14.9% 26.7% 21.4%
1989 11.7% 12.0% 20.0% 15.9%
1994 14.3% 13.9% 26.9% 19.0%
1999 14.3% 14.6% 25.1% 15.0%
Table A1
Composition of Change in Absolute Poverty Since 1979 by Family Type: Britain
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Demographic 
Changes
Demographic 
and Wage 
Changes
Demographic, 
Wage and Work 
Changes
Actual Poverty: 
Demographic, 
Wage, Work and 
Benefit Changes
  Couples With Children
1979 13.1% 13.1% 13.1% 13.1%
1984 13.6% 14.7% 20.5% 19.1%
1989 14.3% 18.4% 22.0% 21.5%
1994 16.4% 21.8% 25.1% 24.3%
1999 15.8% 21.1% 24.9% 22.6%
  Couples Without Children
1979 3.5% 3.5% 3.5% 3.5%
1984 3.8% 4.6% 8.6% 7.1%
1989 3.2% 4.8% 9.1% 7.5%
1994 3.3% 5.7% 11.6% 9.4%
1999 4.4% 7.2% 10.9% 9.0%
  Singles With Children
1979 48.3% 48.3% 48.3% 48.3%
1984 53.2% 58.0% 63.3% 54.4%
1989 55.2% 61.9% 70.1% 66.7%
1994 56.4% 65.5% 72.9% 63.7%
1999 60.2% 67.1% 75.5% 64.7%
  Singles Without Children
1979 13.3% 13.3% 13.3% 13.3%
1984 15.4% 16.9% 26.7% 22.0%
1989 14.9% 18.5% 25.6% 23.2%
1994 16.5% 19.2% 30.3% 25.3%
1999 17.1% 19.9% 30.4% 23.9%
Table A2
Composition of Change in Relative Poverty Since 1979 by Family Type: Britain
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Demographic 
Changes
Demographic 
and Wage 
Changes
Demographic, 
Wage and Work 
Changes
Actual Poverty: 
Demographic, 
Wage, Work and 
Benefit Changes
  Couples With Children
1979 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 6.4%
1984 7.5% 9.1% 10.4% 10.4%
1989 7.9% 9.7% 7.8% 8.0%
1994 7.6% 10.1% 9.0% 8.1%
1999 7.3% 8.7% 6.3% 6.4%
  Couples Without Children
1979 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
1984 2.8% 3.3% 3.9% 3.8%
1989 2.5% 2.8% 2.5% 2.9%
1994 2.5% 2.7% 2.6% 3.1%
1999 2.9% 3.2% 2.8% 2.8%
  Singles With Children
1979 36.9% 36.9% 36.9% 36.9%
1984 38.0% 39.5% 42.0% 45.2%
1989 35.5% 37.5% 38.4% 41.5%
1994 37.1% 40.4% 40.8% 39.5%
1999 31.8% 34.1% 27.6% 29.0%
  Singles Without Children
1979 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%
1984 15.0% 16.1% 17.8% 17.9%
1989 14.4% 15.3% 15.0% 15.3%
1994 15.4% 17.5% 18.3% 18.2%
1999 15.3% 16.2% 15.7% 16.0%
Table A3
Composition of Change in Absolute Poverty Since 1979 by Family Type: US
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Demographic 
Changes
Demographic 
and Wage 
Changes
Demographic, 
Wage and Work 
Changes
Actual Poverty: 
Demographic, 
Wage, Work and 
Benefit Changes
  Couples With Children
1979 23.4% 23.4% 23.4% 23.4%
1984 25.2% 26.0% 26.8% 26.6%
1989 26.0% 27.8% 26.4% 26.4%
1994 25.3% 27.4% 26.6% 26.5%
1999 26.2% 28.4% 26.7% 26.8%
  Couples Without Children
1979 9.5% 9.5% 9.5% 9.5%
1984 10.8% 11.0% 11.5% 11.6%
1989 10.7% 11.3% 11.1% 11.1%
1994 10.9% 11.0% 11.0% 11.0%
1999 11.8% 12.5% 12.0% 11.7%
  Singles With Children
1979 63.9% 63.9% 63.9% 63.9%
1984 65.0% 64.7% 65.1% 66.2%
1989 63.4% 63.2% 65.3% 65.6%
1994 63.4% 63.3% 65.7% 64.6%
1999 61.6% 61.0% 60.7% 61.1%
  Singles Without Children
1979 26.6% 26.6% 26.6% 26.6%
1984 27.3% 27.7% 28.4% 28.6%
1989 27.1% 28.2% 28.5% 28.7%
1994 28.6% 29.6% 30.7% 30.7%
1999 29.2% 30.2% 30.9% 30.8%
Table A4
Composition of Change in Relative Poverty Since 1979 by Family Type: US
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